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We sought to understand how the tobacco industry uses "youth smoking prevention" programs in Latin America. We analyzed tobacco industry documents, socalled "social reports," media reports, and material provided by Latin American public health advocates.
Since the early 1990s, multinational tobacco companies have promoted "youth smoking prevention" programs as part of their "Corporate Social Responsibility" campaigns. The companies also partnered with third-party allies in Latin America, most notably nonprofit educational organizations and education and health ministries.
Even though there is no evidence that these programs reduce smoking among youths, they have met the industry ' Convention on Tobacco Control, the first health treaty with binding obligations to implement national tobacco control legislation among the parties. Despite widespread support for the treaty in Latin America, there are likely to be numerous obvious and subtle challenges to full implementation of its provisions. The Latin American cigarette market is almost entirely controlled by British American Tobacco (BAT, 60%) and Philip Morris International (PMI, 40%). 4 In addition, RJ Reynolds Tobacco (RJR) has a market presence in Puerto Rico, and RJR International had licensing agreements with BAT to market Camel cigarettes until 1999, when RJR International was bought by Japan Tobacco to form Japan Tobacco International (JTI). Beginning in the United States in the early 1980s, the tobacco industry has promoted 4 types of "youth smoking prevention" programs to avoid effective tobacco control policies 6 : programs directed at parents (e.g., the Tobacco Institute's "Helping Youth Decide," 1984), youths (e.g., RJR's "Right Decisions, Right Now," 1991), and retailers (e.g., Philip Morris USA's "Action Against Access," 1995) and programs providing funding to youth organizations (e.g., 4-H's "Health Rocks").
During the 1980s and 1990s, the industry spread these programs to the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, 6 Australia, using the keywords "youth," "youth smoking prevention," "YSP," "prevention," "access," "youth programs," "youth initiatives," "underage smoking," "juvenile smoking," and "Latin America." We also used the names of specific countries, specific dates, names of youth programs, names of local educational nongovernmental organizations, and reference (Bates) numbers.
After identifying the first documents or words, we used a snowball strategy to locate new documents. A total of 140 documents were found to be relevant for this study.
We also reviewed other Internet-based information resources, regional newspapers and magazines, material collected from Latin American tobacco control advocates, and the socalled "social reports," which provide descriptions of the activities developed by the companies to achieve different objectives, and the stakeholders involved in the process, published by BAT's Latin America affiliates (available on the BAT Web site: http:// www.bat.com/global), which are part of its corporate social responsibility campaign.
FINDINGS
Ecuador Takes the Initiative (1990) (1991) Ecuador was the first Latin American country in which the transnational tobacco companies launched a campaign to "discourage juvenile smoking." 11 Leiber went on to describe the rationale and the strategy of the youth campaign for Latin America:
Rationale
Taking into consideration the emerging adverse legislative climate in the region, we have an opportunity to create good will for the tobacco industry by going public with a campaign to discourage juvenile smoking.
Our objective is to communicate that the tobacco industry is not interested in having young people smoke and to position the industry as "a concerned corporate citizen" in an effort to ward off further attacks by the anti-tobacco movement.
Our goal is to have the commercial "in the can" and available for use, as market conditions warrant.
Strategy
To convince the target group (young people aged up to 18 years and their parents), that smoking is not appropriate for young people. The focus is on increasing parental awareness on the subject of youth smoking and promoting open discussion with their children. 16 The commercial was produced by the Leo Burnett Puerto Rico adverting agency, which used animated characters (matches) to represent a family having a conversation about adult issues such as smoking. The text read, "Help your kids make the right choices. Smoking is an adult decision." 16 The commercial was complemented by 2 print advertisements and a brochure telling parents how to talk to their kids. 17 The US $85 000 cost was split between PMI (US $50 000) and PMLA (US $35 000). 18 Reflecting its success in Ecuador, PMLA strongly recommended seeking the endorsement of the minister of health or other governmental authority in all markets. 16 In December 1993, the commercial, "Smoking Is an Adult Decision," was tested on focus groups. After final approval, PMLA proceeded with production and sought BAT's cosponsorship to share the costs. 19 We were unable to  GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, AND LAW  determine whether BAT served as cosponsor. In December 1993, Leo Burnett Puerto Rico sent a qualitative research proposal to PMLA to evaluate its youth campaign in Argentina, Brazil, and Puerto Rico. 20, 21 The objectives of the research were as follows:
• To obtain positive and negative reactions of the execution.
• Evaluate likes and dislikes.
• Determine the main message being communicated. 24 Leiber reported that the objective was to "maintain and proactively protect our ability to advertise, promote and market our products via a juvenile initiative [emphasis in original]." 24 PMI's employees, the government, opinion leaders, retailers, and the general public-not childrenwere identified as critical audiences. Leiber summarized the session as follows:
Finally, the ultimate challenge to maintaining and proactively protecting our ability to advertise, promote and market our products rests with our ability to seek enforcement of laws which deny youth access to tobacco produces. While enforcement technically is not our job, we realize that if we are unable to develop a system for enforcement, we will continue to be subjected to the threats of the anti-tobacco movement and the restrictive legislation which results [emphasis added]. 24 On May 18, 1995, Leiber distributed a memo to PMLA subsidiaries announcing the creation of a mini task force to deal with the youth initiatives. Local subsidiaries would choose between 2 programs according to their needs and priorities: the Philip Morris marketing code (a set of guidelines for the company's voluntary self-regulation of advertising) or the prohibition of the sales of cigarettes to minors. 25 According to Leiber Anticipating new regulations on tobacco marketing activities outside the United States, Geoffrey C. Bible, the chairman of the board and chief executive officer of Philip Morris, the parent company, asked PMLA, as well as other regional officials of PMI, to prepare a report describing what had been done on the issue of preventing youths' access to tobacco. 26 He probably was concerned about discussions over the national litigation settlement then being conducted in the US Congress and the White House, 27 which were "touching on international implications."
(1) local cigarette marketing codes, (2) sampling guidelines, (3) minimum age of purchase laws and voluntary underage labels, (4) retailer programs, and (5) education programs. [28] [29] [30] These programs aimed to protect PMI's marketing activities by anticipating and deflecting any regulations in the Latin American region. Leiber emphasized the importance of getting public officials in each country to support the programs: "In order to continue to protect our ability to market and advertise to adults, we must be pre-emptive, proactive, communicative and cooperative with government officials." 26 As a public relations tactic to achieve this support, Leiber said, PMLA representatives "regularly meet with presidents, first ladies, prime ministers, ministers of education, ministers of health and presidents of congressional commissions to seek their support, endorsement and, . . . their cosponsorship." 28 In October 1998, PMLA released a second annual report highlighting the activities taken to support "youth access prevention and education initiatives." 31 According to Leiber, the report "will be used by our affiliates in their meetings with government officials and regional media to demonstrate our leadership on the youth access prevention issue." 31 Earlier the same year, the guidelines that nominally restricted giving away free samples of cigarettes to children were incorporated into the cigarette marketing codes. In addition, voluntary "underage labels"
(warning that the sale of cigarettes to minors was forbidden) printed on cigarette packages were adopted to support the minimum age of purchase laws.
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PMLA also sought the support of local third parties and BAT to implement its program.
The 5-point programs developed for the Latin American region had some specific characteristics in each country, and not all of the countries adopted all 5 programs.
Cigarette marketing codes. Tobacco industry codes for the voluntary self-regulation of advertising have been established worldwide since the 1970s, nominally to "restrict" tobacco advertising, sponsorship, and sampling aimed at minors. [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] Using the 1993 PMI Marketing Code as a model, the company's Latin American subsidiaries issued codes that promised to "market their cigarettes responsibly and only to adults" 30,37 to prevent the approval of effective governmental tobacco control regulations. Generally, the codes were endorsed by the local national manufacturer's association, the local advertising agency association, the International Advertising Association, and the media trade association, 37 As Philip Morris USA had done since 1995, in early 1998, PMLA started to voluntarily place underage labels on cigarette packages. Depending on the legal status in each country, 3 different legends were established: "Venta Prohibida a Menores" ("Sale Prohibited to Minors") for countries with minimum age of purchase laws, "Sólo para Adultos" ("Only  GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, AND LAW  for Adults") for those without federal laws or with a minimum age law that fell below 18 years (such as Colombia), and "Underage Sale Prohibited" for Puerto Rico and for standard export products. 39 Retailer programs. A fourth component was the launching of retailer programs, "retail signage campaigns for the point-of-sale to discourage youth access." 28 As mentioned earlier, in 1994, Puerto Rico was the first country in Latin America in which the tobacco companies launched a retailer program ("It's the Law").
The industry rapidly spread similar programs throughout the region, often with the cooperation of the government and other elements of the business sector. Retailer programs were endorsed by ministries of health ( 1999, 3 million students and 50 000 teachers were reported to be participating in the program. 40 According In some countries, such as Venezuela, the program was renamed "Yo Tengo V.A.L.O.R. (Vida, Acción, Logro, Orgullo, Responsabilidad)" ("I Have Courage: Life, Action, Achievement, Pride, Responsibility").
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School-based education programs were supported by the Ministry of Education in most of the countries, the Ministry of Justice in Venezuela, and the president in Paraguay ( Table 2 ).
The MTV Advertising Campaign
In 2001, JTI together with BAT and PMI launched a television advertising campaign on the MTV European network for 18 weeks, "featuring young, hip and active people who don't smoke." 58 The The research confirmed the positive impact of this campaign in making a contribution to creating an environment in which kids are less likely to smoke. This campaign marked an important milestone in our company's and the industry's commitment to the Youth Smoking Prevention cause. By using creative visuals and media, we were able to effectively communicate our messages to help young people resist peer pressure to smoke. 58 The Web site did not provide citations to scientific studies that documented that these statements were correct and we did not find any such evidence. On the contrary, a nonindustry study carried out in the United States among adolescents aged 14 to 17 who were exposed to industrysponsored antismoking ads (including the MTV campaign) concluded that the ads had a boomerang effect, engendering more favorable attitudes toward the tobacco companies, which did more to promote corporate image than to prevent youth smoking. 59 
COMMENTS
The tobacco industry first developed its "youth smoking prevention" programs in the early 1980s in the United States to deflect attention from the industry's marketing practices and to allow the industry to argue that government measures to control tobacco were not necessary. 6 In response to increasing pressure from the tobacco control movement during the early 1990s, the tobacco companies introduced "youth smoking prevention" programs in Latin America 2 as well as other regions of the world. [6] [7] [8] [9] Similar strategies were developed in the United States and in Latin America. The US media campaigns "Think, Don't Smoke" (Philip Morris) and "Tobacco Is Whacko" (Lorillard) were similar to "Fumar Es una As in the United States, the industry's Latin American "educational" programs concentrated on promoting "adult choices" that reinforce the central message of tobacco advertising to youths, which is to present smoking as a way for adolescents to "grow up." 22, [60] [61] [62] [63] The emphasis on peer pressure and parental behavior also shifts the focus away from the industry's responsibility for tobacco use by youths. Indeed, Philip Morris's own research on its "Matches" campaign found evidence that these messages could indirectly encourage smoking. [64] [65] [66] As in the United States, 6 the industry's evaluation of "effectiveness" was not based on any evidence that its "youth smoking prevention" programs actually reduced smoking by youths; rather, it was based on whether they had a positive (from the industry's perspective) impact on how the public and public policymakers perceived the tobacco industry. The fact that adults-not youths-were the primary audience for the campaigns is evident in how they were promoted. Program, a school-based drug prevention program promoted by Philip Morris and BAT in the United States, showed no effects in terms of reducing youths' smoking. 67 The tobacco industry has been successful in partnering with third-party allies in Latin America. In addition to allies in the business community, such as tobacco retailers and the hospitality industry, 68 the tobacco industry identified a local nonprofit educational organization in each country to recruit its education programs. One of the most prominent examples is Conciencia, an Argentinean educational organization, which also has branches in Uruguay and Paraguay. "Yo Tengo P.O.D.E.R."
has been implemented by this organization with funds from PMI. This association was valuable to the tobacco companies because it helped legitimize them. In some countries, the industry also obtained the cosponsorship of the national media associations. 37 These efforts helped portray the tobacco companies as concerned corporate citizens 69 and have created an opportunity in which some politicians (e.g., in Ecuador) allowed the tobacco industry to draft and water down "antitobacco" legislation.
The most important outcome that tobacco companies achieved in several countries was the endorsement by public officials and national authorities, in particular the education and health ministries. This tactic both legitimizes the tobacco industry and helps it build ties with government that could be valuable in opposing future tobacco control policies.
The industry strategy in Latin America undermines the implementation of more effective tobacco control measures, including those required by the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, 70 by allowing BAT, PMI, and JTI to continue marketing tobacco products to young people in accordance with their International Marketing Standards for Tobacco Products (adopted in September 2001). These actions allow the companies to claim that the measures required by the Framework Convention on Tobacco Controlincreased tobacco taxes, a complete ban on tobacco advertising and sponsorship, aggressive countermarketing media campaigns, strong picture-based health warning labels printed on cigarette packages, and the creation of 100% smoke-free enclosed environments-are unnecessary (Table 3) . Tobacco control and health advocates and policymakers in Latin America need to understand and expose the real intentions of tobacco industrysponsored "youth smoking prevention" programs. Local nonprofit youth and educational organizations need to avoid being co-opted by tobacco companies, whose only purpose is to preserve their markets. Because the tobacco industry replicates programs throughout the region that are ineffective (in terms of actually reducing smoking), other effective mass-media campaigns 72 could be adapted to social and cultural realities in Latin America. The US countermarketing campaign "Truth" showed evidence of success in reducing tobacco use among youths. 73, 74 
